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Temptation!
 An age-old human problem
 Allow high-inflation to develop in an economy
 An “easy” monetary policy can stimulate the 
economy to grow faster and lower 
unemployment rate in the short-run
 Improved tax revenue for government
 Public debt situation is made good
Introduction
 Central bank independence (CBI) is often 
cited as prescription to assure price stability 
in an economy
 Cross-country empirical studies especially in 
industrial economies suggest a negative 
relationship between CBI and inflation
 Hayo and Hefeker (2002)
 CBI is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
reaching monetary stability
High CBI and Low Inflation?
 Eijffinger & Haan (1996): 3 theories:
 Public-choice theory
 Buchanam & Wagner (1977)
 Sargent-Wallace (1981) theory
 Time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy
 Kydland & Prescott (1977)
 Calvo (1978)
 Barro & Gordon (1983)
Cukierman et al. (1992) & 
Berger et al. (2001)
 Summary of empirical studies
 Among industrial countries, legal CBI index is 
negatively correlated with inflation but TOR 
(turnover of central bank governors) has no 
correlation with inflation
 Among developing countries, legal CBI index 
is not correlated with inflation but TOR is 
significantly related to inflation
Panagiotidis et al. (2006)  --- Greece
 1951-99: data before Greece joined EMU
 Time series data on Legal CBI and TOR
 Legal CBI is systematically and inversely 
related to the rate of inflation
 TOR did not exhibit a significant relationship 
with inflation
Otero & Ramirez (2006) -- Colombia
 Constitutional Reform in 1991
 Central bank independence guaranteed
 Creation of an independent central bank 
changed some parameters of the model
 Disequilibrium in goods and monetary 
markets have smaller effect on inflation after 
central bank independence was granted
In the Beginning
 WACB (West African Currency Board) was set up 
by the British colonial government to 
administer pound sterling within British West 
Africa
 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) charged with 
responsibility for developing money and 
capital markets
 CBN used direct controls such as:
 Credit guidelines
 Moral suasion
Major Banking Laws
 CBN Act 1958 & Amendments
 Banking Decree 1969 & Amendments
 Define legal framework within which CBN 
operates
 Main functions include
 Issue legal tender currency
 Maintain external reserves & international value of naira
 Promote monetary stability and sound financial structure
SAP and Macroeconomy
 CBN Decree #24 & BOFI Decree #25: 1991
 Provisions announced in 1988
 More comprehensive than any previous laws
 Considerable power given to CBN
 CBN to consult with gov’t before critical decisions 
are taken
 CBN proposals are a component of annual budget 
speeches
 Ojo (2000) notes: in practice CBN had no power
CBN (Amendment) Decree #3, 1997
BOFI (Amendment) Decree #4, 1997
 Removed all CBN’s limited discretion in the 
conduct of its monetary policy under the 1991 
laws
 CBN brought under the Minister of Finance
 CBN’s Board of Governors to have an 
external person (politician) as Chair
CBN (Amendment) Decree #37, 1998
BOFI (Amendment) Decree #38, 1998
 New Decrees repealed all 1997 Decrees
 CBN has Permanent Secretary in Ministry of 
Finance on Board
 CBN’s Board of Governors now Governor as 
Chair
 Fine-tune the process of government 
borrowing from the CBN
 FSRCC set up to coordinate supervision
New CBN Law & Monetary Policy
 Much more meaningful autonomy
 Some discretion to implement its monetary 
policy without government interference
 Some reasonable freedom for bank to select 
policy instrument
 Primary objectives are:
 Maintain monetary stability
 A sound financial structure
Political Autonomy for CBN?
 Conflict resolution between the bank the 
government can be resolved at the Board of 
Directors level 
 Perm. Sec of Ministry of Finance serves on the 
Board
 Appointment (removal) of Governor and 
Board members is done by the President
Economic Autonomy for CBN?
 A clear limit on lending to government
 Authority to determine exchange rate
 Required to issue periodic report on its 
operations to the President/legislators
 Financially independent
Research Question
 Is there a relationship between level of 
financial development and management of 
inflation in the Nigerian economy?
 The usual CBI indices do not really mean much in 
Nigeria. Legal CBI index was 0.37 for 1989-2000
 Original mission of CBN was to develop the 
financial system
 CBN employed direct controls rather than the 
traditional monetary policy instruments
Annual Data: 1970-2003
 Beck et al. (2000): Measures of fin. dev’t
 DMCD: Ratio of deposit money banks assets 
to central bank assets
 LLGDP: Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP
 CBGDP: Ratio of central bank assets to GDP
 DMGDP: Ratio of deposit money banks 
assets to GDP
 INF: Inflation index [π/(1 + π)]
Graphical Representation Of Time 
Series 
Data Descriptive Statistics 
INF DMCD LLGDP CBGDP DMGDP
Mean 0.159   0.605 0.210 0.120 0.153
Standard Deviation 0.104 0.169 0.069 0.075 0.058
Skewness 0.963 0.106 -0.076 0.220 0.483
Kurtosis 2.898 2.267 2.032 2.472 2.062
Jarque-Bera Statistic 5.269 0.824 1.361 0.668 2.568
Data Correlation Matrix 
INF DMCD LLGDP CBGDP DMGDP
INF 1.000 -0.455 0.143 0.518 -0.027
DMCD 1.000 -0.306 -0.892 -0.155
LLGDP 1.000 0.516 0.903
CBGDP 1.000 0.417
DMGDP 1.000
Unit Root Test Results 
INF DMCD LLGDP CBGDP DMGDP
SERIES IN LEVELS
ADF Statistic -3.140 -1.415 -1.775 -1.446 -1.261
KPSS Statistic 0.171 0.382*** 0.196 0.460*** 0.194
FIRST DIFFERENCE OF SERIES
ADF Statistic -5.910* -6.114* -4.979* -4.185* -4.500*
KPSS Statistic 0.5000** 0.229 0.153 0.261 0.115
Johansen Bivariate Cointegration Test 
Results 
λi H0 H1 λ-max statistic H0 H1 λ-trace statistic
(a) INFLATION AND DMCD
0.507 r = 0 r = 1 22.647** r = 0 r = 1 24.209**
0.048 r ≤ 1 r = 2 1.562 r ≤ 1 r = 2 1.562
(b) INFLATION AND LLGDP
0.359 r = 0 r = 1 14.225 r = 0 r = 1 17.952**
0.110 r ≤ 1 r = 2 3.727 r ≤ 1 r = 2 3.727
(c)  INFLATION AND CBGDP
0.380 r = 0 r = 1 15.303** r = 0 r = 1 18.351**
0.091 r ≤ 1 r = 2 3.048 r ≤ 1 r = 2 3.048
(d) INFLATION AND DMGDP
0.325 r = 0 r = 1 12.566 r = 0 r = 1 15.082
0.076 r ≤ 1 r = 2 2.516 r ≤ 1 r = 2 2.516
Summary of Results (1)
 Based on ADF unit-root test, all the time 
series data are integrated of order 1
 The Johansen cointegration results show:
 INF and DMCD are cointegrated
 INF and LLGDP are cointegrated
 INF and CBGDP are cointegrated
 INF and DMGDP are not cointegrated
Summary of Results (2)
 Inflation is negatively correlated with DMCD 
and DMGDP
 Inflation is positively correlated with LLGDP 
and CBGDP
Conclusion
 There is a long-run relationship between the 
level of financial development and inflation
 The level of financial development is more 
appropriate than the existing indices of 
central bank independence
 It is not logical to assume that all developing 
countries are homogenous in terms of the 
role and influence of central banks on price 
stability
